0900-0915

Welcome; Recap of Day 1 and Preview of Day 2.

0915-0945

0945-1045

Mitigating Insider Threats in Times of Crisis
Political, economic, and societal turmoil can each wreak havoc on nuclear security. Panelists shared their personal and professional perspectives on the strains imposed by such events as well as the steps taken to overcome challenges and increase organizational resilience.

1115-1215

Panelists highlighted the challenges experienced during HRP implementation. Topics included stakeholder engagement, personnel vetting, and unique cultural and/or legislative barriers.

1115-1215

Artificial intelligence and machine learning can be used to enhance information systems security. They can also be used to create sophisticated attacks that evade detection. Presenters shared current research to explore the risks and rewards of emerging tech on insider threat mitigation.

1115-1215

This session used two recent cases of radioactive materials in the possession of people who have explosives knowledge to underline the importance of developing strategies to find possible insiders. Material that has gone missing in the past cannot be assumed to be gone for good. Therefore, minimizing the use of radioactive materials, wherever possible, can prevent the misuse of such material in a dirty bomb scenario.

1115-1215

Novel Approaches to Mitigate Insider Threats, Pt. 2
The Critical Pathway to Insider Risk is an empirically based behavior model created by Eric Shaw and the CERT Insider Threat Group. The model is used by numerous insider threat programs to help identify potential risk indicators of malicious insider behavior. This talk covered initial development of the model, studies conducted to validate it, and how insider threat programs use the model operationally.

1115-1215

Geographically diverse panelists shared information about security culture initiatives implemented across a variety of facility types.

1315-1415

Participants with varied backgrounds shared their experiences and views, which provided an overview of prioritized red flags and measures in the topic of ‘observation’. The goal was to evaluate, in small groups, a set of red flags and measures and place them in different categories: high/medium/low and must-have/ nice-to-have/ not useful. This exercise is based on doctoral research. At the end of the exercise, participants reviewed and reflected on their choices as compared to the research. Note: The downloadable cards are to be printed 2-sided: Side 1: Observation, Side 2: Logo.

1315-1415

During this exercise, participants learned how an insider with cyber capabilities can negatively impact facility operations. Real world cases will be examined to illustrate best practices to bolster security cybersecurity programs.

1315-1415

The nuclear power industry faces unique challenges with multinational workforces. On one hand, embracing diversity and multicultural teams can lead to dynamic and inclusive organizational environments. However, diversity can also amplify differences in security awareness, culture, vetting, and qualifications. To broadly address these differences and create baseline levels of security, a Nuclear Security Culture exercise addressed these concerns. The exercise identified unique cultural dimensions associated with nations and combined core components with a strong Nuclear Security Culture.

1315-1415

Do you know how to effectively collect information when a suspected insider threat incident has been reported? Techniques from motivational interviewing research were demonstrated to illustrate what works to reduce resistance and increase information collection.

1315-1415

This interactive, realistic scenario-based experience focused on enhancing awareness and implementing strategies to counteract insider threats enabled by cyber means. The session’s primary goal was to educate attendees about the criticality of recognizing and identifying risks, cross functional communication, and coordination between security domains to develop efficient strategies to mitigate these insider threats.

1445-1545

Evaluating States’ Implementation of NMAC for Nuclear Security
Panelists explored barriers to implementation of IAEA guidance (NSS 25-G and 32-T) on NMAC for nuclear security recommendations.

1445-1545

[Novel Approaches to Mitigate Insider Threats, Pt. 3]

1445-1545

Challenges Regulating and Mitigating Threats for A/SMRs
Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMR) pose challenges to a country’s existing regulatory framework, especially regarding security requirements. Panelists explored developing and implementing regulations, technology and operating paradigms, and workforce impacts on insider threat mitigation for these new reactors.

1445-1545

Experts from the social and behavioral sciences discussed the contributors to human error and insider threat, including ways to assess the risk of human error (e.g., human reliability analysis), contributing factors to human error, and tools for minimizing the likelihood of human error.

1445-1545

Building effective ways to measure the success of an insider threat program is important to assess whether and to what extent the program has an impact.

1600-1700

DOEL-4 Incident
This session provided a retrospective of the DOEL-4 sabotage case, which occurred in Belgium in 2014. The case study provided in-depth information on what happened, how the threat was mitigated, and investigated. The case study demonstrated the value of a robust security culture throughout an organization.

1700-1800

Investigating and Responding to Insider Threat Events
Law enforcement and security services experts reflected on their role in preventing, detecting, and responding to insider threats.

1800-1815

Day 2 Wrap-Up/Mentimeter

1815-2000

International Initiatives & Vendor Exposition
Selected organizations and vendors were available to discuss products, materials, and events germane to the insider risk/threat community.

1815-2000

Students & Scholars Poster Session
Interested students and educators were available to discuss their current research with participants.

0900-0910

Welcome; Recap of Day 2 and Preview of Final Day.

0910-1000

Violent extremism has galvanized public fear and attention. The presenters described which factors might increase (risk factors) or decrease (protective factors) risk, how those factors might operate, and how practitioners can prepare risk formulations and scenario plans that inform risk management strategies to prevent violent extremist harm.

1000- 1010

The Integrated Measures Exercise (IME): Introduction

1030-1230

Integrated Measures Exercise (IME)
Four Breakout Rooms
Developed in collaboration with the IWG Steering Committee members, this exercise addressed elements from all five focus groups.

1330-1400

IME Epilogue
Representatives from each of the small groups shared feedback, and key takeaways were reinforced through discussion and Q&A.

1400-1445

Panelists from academia and research institutes reflected on general theories underlying insider risk and threat, educational programs on the topic, and nascent areas of research.

1515-1600

1600-1645