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
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
Agenda


- What is The Critical Pathway to Insider Risk?
- Origins
- Research
- Use in practice

Presentation Name

What is "The Critical Pathway to Insider Risk"








Hostile Act

Problematic Organizational Responses


Concerning Behaviors

Stressors

Personal Predispositions



CERT, 2006








Image courtesy of "The Insider Risk Group," https://www.insiderriskgroup.com/




CERT's Critical Path to Insider Risk




Adapted from Shaw, Eric, and Laura Sellers. "Application of the Critical-Path Method to Evaluate Insider Risks." Studies in Intelligence 59.2 (Extracts, June 2015)

Origins


Model: Insider Sabotage



Insider Sabotage Model Simplified



CERT's Critical Path to Insider Risk



Adapted from Shaw, Eric, and Laura Sellers. "Application of the Critical-Path Method to Evaluate Insider Risks." Studies in Intelligence 59.2 (Extracts, June 2015)

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Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage: A Model-Based Analysis


Stephen R. Band, Ph.D. (Counterintelligence Field Activity - Behavioral Science Directorate)
Dawn M. Cappelli (CERT)
Lynn F. Fischer, Ph.D. (DoD Personnel Security Research Center)
Andrew P. Moore (CERT)
Eric D. Shaw, Ph.D. (Consulting & Clinical Psychology, Ltd.)
Randall F. Trzeciak (CERT)

December 2006


TECHNICAL REPORT CMU/SEI-2006-TR-026 ESC-TR-2006-091

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2006 PERSEREC-CERT Espionage Model



Abstracted Common (Espionage) Model



Behavioral Precursors Observed in Cases

Drug use

Conflicts (coworkers, supervisor)

Aggressive or violent behavior

Web surfing, chat rooms at work

Mood swings

Bizarre behavior

Used organization's computers for personal business


Poor performance

EEO complaint

Absence/tardiness

Sexual harassment

Poor hygiene



Technical Precursors Undetected in Cases

- Downloading and use of "hacker tools" such as rootkits, password sniffers, or password crackers
- Failure to create backups as required
- Failure to document systems or software as required
- Unauthorized access of customers' systems
- Unauthorized use of coworkers' machines left logged in
- Sharing passwords with others & demanding passwords from subordinates
- System access following termination
- Refusal to swipe badge to record physical access
- Access of web sites prohibited by acceptable use policy
- Refusal to return laptop upon termination
- Use of backdoor accounts
- Use of organization's system for game playing, violating acceptable use policy
- Set up every new computer for easy access remotely




Supporting Research

Research Through the Years

- Shaw & Fischer, 2005
- Band et al., 2006
- Shaw, 2006
- Shaw, Fischer, & Rose, 2009
- Shaw & Strock, 2001
- Shaw & Sellars, 2015
- Claycomb, W. R., Huth, C. L., Flynn, L., McIntire, D. M., Lewellen, T. B., & Center, C. I. T. (2012). Chronological examination of insider threat sabotage: Preliminary observations. Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications, 3, 4–20.

Use in Practice

In Practice



Questions

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